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V

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

C. DEAN LARSEN,

:

Case No. 920114
Ct. of App. No. 900473-CA
Category No. 14

Defendant-Petitioner. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals.

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear the case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Two issues are presented for review:
1.

Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that

"intent to defraud" is not an element of securities fraud under
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) (1989) and properly uphold the trial
court's instructions on the requisite mental state for a criminal
violation of that statute?
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law
and is reviewed for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 798
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).
2.

Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that

the trial court had reasonably exercised its discretion in
admitting expert testimony on the issue of "materiality"?

"Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a
question of law, and [an appellate court] always reviewfs]
questions of law under a correctness standard," but when the rule
of evidence "vests a measure of discretion in the trial court,"
the appellate court reverses only if it concludes that the trial
court exercised its discretion unreasonably.

State v. Ramirez,

817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented for review is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with numerous offenses,
including eighteen counts of securities fraud under Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-1(2) (1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989)
(amended 1990, 1991, 1992) (R. 511-26).

After the trial court

granted defendant's motion to sever (R. 1023), he was tried on
the eighteen counts of securities fraud.

A jury found him guilty

on all counts (R. 1434-51).
The court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison
for a term of zero to three years on all eighteen counts, three
of the terms to run consecutively to the others, which are to run
concurrently, and ordered him to pay fines and restitution on
each count (R. 1474-91).

The execution of the sentence was

stayed until resolution of the' other counts charged in the
information (ibid.).

Defendant filed a petition for a
2

certificate of probable cause which was eventually granted, and
defendant is currently free on bail.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed
defendant's convictions.
App. 1992).

State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah

This Court granted certiorari.

State v. Larsen. 836

P.2d 1385 (Utah 1992).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Given the questions presented for review, a statement
of facts beyond that set forth in the Statement of the Case is
unnecessary.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Criminal liability for a violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 61-1-1(2) (1989) does not require proof of intent to defraud in
addition to proof of willfulness.

Therefore, the court of

appeals correctly upheld the trial court's instructions to the
jury which defined "willfully" as the culpable mental state for
the crime of securities fraud under section 61-1-1(2).
Additionally, because section 61-1-1(2) does not require proof of
an intent to defraud, the court of appeals correctly upheld the
trial court's refusal to give defendant's requested instruction
on the defense of "good faith."
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the court of
appeals, applying an abuse of discretion standard of review,
incorrectly upheld the trial court's admission of expert
testimony on the issue of "materiality."

In light of case law

from this court and the federal courts interpreting rules 702 and
3

704 of the Rules of Evidence, the court of appeals properly
concluded that the trial court had reasonably exercised its
discretion in admitting the expert testimony.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE
MENTAL STATE FOR A CRIMINAL VIOLATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN. § 61-1-1(2) (1989) WERE PROPER; IT
ALSO CORRECTLY UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S
REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH
Defendant argues that the court of appeals erred in
holding that the trial court correctly refused to give two of his
requested jury instructions concerning the elements of and
defenses to securities fraud.

The first of those instructions

would have told the jury that, for purposes of Utah Code Ann,
§ 61-1-1(2) (1989) and Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-21 (1989) (amended
1990, 1991, 1992)1, an act or omission "is done 'wilfully' if
done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent
to do something the law forbids; that is to say with bad purpose
either to disobey or disregard the law[,] . . . the bad purpose
• . . be[ing] the specific intent to defraud."

Defendant's

Requested Jury Instr. No. 5 (R. 1355) (Appendix B to Br. of
Pet.).

The second would have instructed the jury that "a

representation made by the Defendant in good faith constitutes a
complete defense to a charge of Securities Fraud."

1

Defendant's

Hereafter, all references to Title 61 provisions are to
the 1989 volume of the Code.

4

Requested Jury Instr. No. 30 (R. 1381) (Appendix B to Br. of
Pet.).
The trial court purported to give defendant's
instruction no. 5 in substance, excising the references to bad
purpose and intent to defraud and simply instructing the jury
that the culpable mental state for securities fraud is
M

willfully.,,

Jury Instr. Nos. 14# 17, 17A (R. 1309, 1312, 1313)

(Appendix C to Br. of Pet.).

The court refused to give

defendant's good faith instruction; however, it informed the jury
that "ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable
mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime."
Jury Instr. No. 17A (R. 1313).
On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the trial
court's instructions.

Defendant asserts this was error.

In that

the court of appeals' holding is based on an interpretation of
statutes, that holding is reviewed for correctness.

See Ward v.

Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990) (interpretation of
statute involves question of law reviewed for correctness); State
v. Macruire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992) (no deference accorded court
of appeals' conclusion on question of law).
Defendant claims that United States Supreme Court cases
interpreting federal securities laws dictate that section 61-11(2) be interpreted to require proof of "scienter" (i.e., intent
to defraud, manipulate, or deceive)2, and therefore the trial
2

Defendant uses the term "scienter" as it was defined in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976): "intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Hereafter, the State
5

court and the court of appeals incorrectly concluded otherwise.
Furthermore, he claims that because a good faith defense goes
hand-in-hand with the intent to defraud element, the trial court
incorrectly refused to give the requested good faith instruction.
The court of appeals rejected defendant's arguments on
the ground that the "Utah Code specifies willfulness as the
culpable mental state for securities fraud" and the trial court's
"instruction on willfulness mirrorfed] the statutory definition."
State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App.), cert, granted,
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).

Although the court of appeals'

analysis might have been more thorough, its approval of the trial
court's instructions is correct.
A,

Intent to Defraud

As defendant notes, in 1963 the legislature
substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act, calling it the
Utah Uniform Securities Act.

See § 61-1-1 et sea.: Unif.

Securities Act, 7B U.L.A. 515-680 (1985) (hereafter cited as
Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A.

). Section 61-1-1, which is at issue in

this case, is nearly identical to section 101 of the Uniform
Securities Act.

Section 101 contains the same language as

Federal Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-10b-5 (rule
10b-5).

As the official comments to the Uniform Securities Act

make clear, section 101 "is substantially the Securities and
Exchange Commission's Rule X-10b-5, which in turn was modeled
upon § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)."
generally will refer to "scienter" as "intent to defraud."

6

Official Comment, Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A. 516.
Section 61-1-27 provides that the Utah Uniform
Securities Act "may be so construed as to effect its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it
and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this
chapter with the related federal regulation" (emphasis added).
Relying on this section and the history of the Uniform Securities
Actf defendant argues that, because the United States Supreme
Court has held that a civil action under rule 10b-5 requires
proof of an intent to defraud, a criminal prosecution under
section 61-1-1(2) necessarily requires proof of intent to defraud
in addition to proof of willfulness.

However, this argument

ignores the plain language of the pertinent statutes and,
alternatively, misapplies the Supreme Court decisions.
1.

Plain Language

Defendant was convicted under section 61-1-1(2), which
makes it
unlawful for any person, in connection with
the offer, sale, or purchase of any security,
directly or indirectly to . . . make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading[.]
Criminal liability attaches when a person "willfully" violates
that provision.

§ 61-1-21. Nothing in the plain language of

sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 gives rise to an intent to defraud
element.

Those sections are clear and unambiguous:

securities

fraud is committed when a person "willfully" makes a misstatement
7

or an omission of a material fact.

"Willfully" is defined

elsewhere in the Code to mean the same thing as "intentionally"
or "with intent."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (1990)3.

There

is no reference to the additional element of "intent to defraud."
Defendant reaches far beyond the plain language of the
statutes to construe section 61-1-1(2) as requiring an intent to
defraud in addition to the element of willfulness.

He ignores

the settled principle that, in determining legislative intent,
this Court begins with a statute's plain language and will resort
to other methods of statutory interpretation only if the language
of the statute is ambiguous.

See Shurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.,

814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497,
500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam).

He also fails to acknowledge that

when the terms of a statute are unambiguous, an appellate court
construes those terms in accord with their usual and accepted
meaning.

State v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 15 n.27 (Utah

Mar. 11, 1992).

This Court has correctly rejected defendant's

approach in a similar case.
In State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1325 (Utah 1983)
(per curiam), the defendant argued that the trial court "erred in
failing to instruct that intent to defraud is a necessary element
of a bad check charge."

The Court rejected this argument on the

ground that "the offense calls for no such element."
3

Ibid.

Section 76-2-103(1) provides: "A person engages in
conduct . . . [iIntentionally, or with intent or willfully
with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his
conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage
in the conduct or cause the result" (emphasis added).
8

Indeed, the legislature had eliminated the "intent to defraud"
element from the statute, making it clear that "[t]he element of
'knowledge' of the overdraft is now sufficient to support a
conviction."

Ibid.

See also State v. Bercrwerff, 777 P.2d 510,

511 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that intent to defraud an insurance
company is not an element of aggravated arson because such an
intent is not contained in the plain language of the statute).
The court of appeals correctly looked to the plain
language of sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 in concluding that the
culpable mental state for a criminal violation of section 61-11(2) is "willfully."

It properly rejected defendant's argument

that intent to defraud is a required, additional mental element
of the offense. ££.. State v. Facer. 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah
1976) (identifying "intentionally" as the culpable mental state
for securities fraud).

Other courts interpreting similar

statutes have concluded that the plain language requires nothing
more than proof the defendant acted "willfully."

For instance,

the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, interpreting securities fraud
statutes nearly identical to sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21, held
that Wisconsin's false statement provision did not require an
intent to defraud because the statute "makes no reference to
intent to defraud."

State v. Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 528, 322

N.W.2d 522, 526 (1982).

Relying on the principle that "[w]hen

statutory language is unambiguous, th[e] court will arrive at the
intent of the legislature by giving the language its ordinary and
accepted meaning," the court of appeals concluded that "had the
9

legislature wanted to require specific intent to defraud, it
would have explicitly stated so."

108 Wis.2d at 530, 322 N.W.2d

at 527. Rather, the legislature had identified "wilfully" as the
culpable mental state.

108 Wis.2d at 529-30, 322 N.W.2d at 526-

27.
In a similar context, the California Court of Appeal,
construing California's securities fraud laws, stated:
It is settled that the omission of
"knowingly" from a penal statute indicates
that guilty knowledge is not an element of
the offense. Had the Legislature intended to
require proof of guilty knowledge or scienter
under section 25540, it could have so stated
by using the word "knowingly." Willfulness
does not require proof of evil motive or
intent to violate the law or knowledge of
illegality.
People v. Johnson, 213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366, 369
(1989).
Additionally, a survey of the Utah Code reveals that
when the legislature intended to make intent to defraud the
culpable mental state for an offense, it used the words "intent
to defraud."

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-20-27 (1991), 39-6-

104(4) (1988), 41-la-1319 (Supp. 1992), 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1992),
76-6-518 (1990), 76-10-706 (1990), 76-10-1006 (1990).

Compare

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(9)(c) (1992) ("The commission or court
need not find a bad motive or specific intent to defraud . . . to
establish willfulness under this section.").

This further

supports the court of appeals' plain language approach and its
ultimate rejection of defendant's proposed construction of
section 61-1-1(2).
10

2.

Beyond the Plain Language

Even if this Court were to accept defendant's
invitation to look beyond the plain language of the statutes, he
ignores pertinent language in the official comments to the
Uniform Securities Act and misapplies the United States Supreme
Court decisions he claims are controlling.
Defendant contends that because the source of section
61-1-1 —

section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act —

is

substantially rule 10b-5, Utah's statute must be interpreted in
the criminal context as the Supreme Court has construed rule 10b5 in civil actions.

He bases this contention on section 61-1-27,

which provides that Utah's securities fraud laws "may be so
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to • . .
coordinate the interpretation and administration of this chapter
with the related federal regulation" (emphasis added).
An initial problem with this position is that section
61-1-27 says Utah's securities act "may," rather than "shall," be
construed to coordinate its interpretation with related federal
regulation.
provision:

The Uniform Securities Act contains a "shall"
"This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its

general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration
of this act with the related federal regulation."

Unif. Act

S 415, 7B U.L.A. 678. Defendant does not note or discuss this
significant difference between Utah's law and the Uniform
Securities Act.

Indeed, this distinction undermines the basic

11

premise of his argument:

that "the Utah Act must be construed to

effectuate this 'general purpose' r'to coordinate the
interpretation of this chapter with the related federal
regulation'1."

Br. of Pet. at 9-10 (first emphasis added).

The

truth is the legislature preferred a more flexible approach which
does not bind Utah's courts to federal court interpretations of
federal securities laws.
But even beyond this defect in defendant's argument,
neither the Supreme Court cases nor the official comments to the
Uniform Securities Act dictate that section 61-1-1(2) be
interpreted to require an intent to defraud.
The Supreme Court Cases
Defendant relies principally on Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).

There, the issue was "whether

an action for civil damages may lie under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5 . . . in the absence of an allegation of
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the part of the
defendant."

425 U.S. at 187-88.4

Based on a review of the

4

Section 10b, from which rule 10b-5 derives, makes it
"'unlawful for any person . . . (b) [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.'" Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195 (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 78j) • Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any
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plain language of section 10(b) and its legislative history, the
Court held that a private cause of action for damages will not
lie under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 -in the absence of any
allegation of 'scienter' —
defraud.-

intent to deceive, manipulate, or

id. at 193.
Relying on this language from Hochfelder, defendant

asserts that criminal liability under section 61-1-1(2) will not
lie unless there is proof of intent to defraud in addition to
proof of willfulness.

Defendant erroneously views Hochfelder in

isolation and fails to give due consideration to at least one
other significant Supreme Court case.
When the Court decided Hochfelder, it "was primarily
concerned with rejecting Hochfelder's contention that mere
negligent omissions sufficed to establish a claim under Rule 10b5."

United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1370 (2nd Cir.

1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

See also

national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197.

In concluding that a private action

under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 requires an allegation of
"scienter," Hochfelder did not thoroughly analyze the specific
language of rule 10b-5; rather, the Court focused primarily on
the language of § 10(b) and its legislative history.

See 425

U.S. at 212. The Court noted that rule 10b-5 "was a hastily
drafted response to a situation clearly involving intentional
misconduct . . . [and,] [a]lthough adopted pursuant to § 10(b),
the language of the Rule appears to have been derived in
significant part from § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77q."
425 U.S. at 212-13 n.32. Thus, if the language

of rule 10b-5,

which provided the model for section 101 of the Uniform
Securities Act, is to be fairly interpreted in light of all the
relevant Supreme Court case law, this Court must also examine
decisions interpreting section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.
Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the
offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by
the use of the mails, directly or
indirectly —
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means
of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or
14

deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. S 17q(a).

The language of this statute is very similar

to that of rule 10b-5 and section 61-1-1.
1(2) is a mirror image of section 17(a)(2).

In fact, section 61-1The Supreme Court

determined what mental state is required for a violation of
section 17(a) in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
There, the Court held that under section 17(a),
"scienter" (i.e., intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud) is
required for subsection (1) but not subsections (2) and (3). 446
U.S. at 697. Focusing on the plain language of subsection (2),
the language at issue in the instant case (see 61-1-1(2)), the
Court said:
[T]he language of § 17(a)(2), which
prohibits any person from obtaining money or
property "by means of any untrue statement of
a material fact or any omission to state a
material fact," is devoid of any suggestion
whatsoever of a scienter requirement. As a
well-known commentator has noted, "[t]here is
nothing on the face of Clause (2) itself
which smacks of scienter
or intent to
defraud." 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation
1442 (2d ed. 1961). In fact, this Court in
Hochfelder pointed out that the similar
language of Rule 10b-5(b) "could be read as
proscribing . . . any type of material
misstatement or omission . . . that has the
effect of defrauding investors, whether the
wrongdoing was intentional or not."
Id. at 696 (citation omitted).
In short, contrary to defendant's contention, the
Supreme Court case law interpreting related federal regulation
does not dictate that section 61-1-1(2) be construed to require
proof of an intent to defraud.

Aaron's analysis of section

15

17(a), which through rule 10b-5 was a model for section 101 of
the Uniform Securities Act and therefore section 61-1-1, is at
least as instructive as Hochfelder when it comes to interpreting
section 61-1-1(2).

Thus, it is not surprising that several state

courts have relied on Aaron in holding that their 61-1-1(2)-type
provisions do not require an intent to defraud.

See, e.g., State

v. Tembv, 108 Wis. at 528-29, 322 N.W.2d at 526-27; People v.
Whitlow, 89 111.2d 322, 334-35, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982).
Official Comments to the Uniform Securities Act
An additional flaw in defendant's argument becomes
apparent when the official comments to pertinent provisions of
the Uniform Securities Act are examined.

Section 409 of the Act

provides that criminal liability attaches when a person
"willfully" violates a provision of the Act.

The Utah

Legislature adopted a similar provision in section 61-1-21 which,
as previously noted, sets forth the willfulness requirement for
criminal liability.
The official comment to section 409 refers the reader
to the comment under section 204(a)(2)(B) for "the meaning of
'willfully.'"

Official Comment, Unif. Act S 409, 7B U.L.A. 632.

That comment states in pertinent part:
As the federal courts and the SEC have
construed the term "willfully" in § 15(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78o(b), all that is required is
proof that the person acted intentionally in
the sense that he was aware of what he was
doing. Proof of evil motive or intent to
violate the law, or knowledge that the law
16

was being violated is not required.
Official Comment, Unif. Act S 204(a)(2)(B), 7B U.L.A. 545. This
passage expressly condemns the "specific intent to violate the
law/bad purpose" element of defendant's requested instruction no.
5 (R. 1355) (Appendix B to Br. of Pet.).

It also seriously

undercuts defendant's argument that to establish a criminal
violation of section 61-1-1(2) there must be proof of intent to
defraud in addition to proof of willfulness.
Significant State and Federal Criminal Cases
Defendant also fails to give due weight to either the
substantial state case law holding that an intent to defraud is
not an element of 61-1-1(2)-type statutes or the handful of
federal securities fraud decisions that have addressed the
"scienter" question in the criminal context.
On the state level, numerous courts have held that
intent to defraud is not an element of the crime of securities
fraud under statutes similar to section 61-1-1(2); proof that the
defendant acted "willfully" is all that is required.

See, e.g.,

People v. Mitchell, 175 Mich.App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304, 306-08
(1989), appeal denied, 433 Mich. 895 (1990); People v. Johnson,
213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366 (1989), review denied
(Cal. Dec. 21, 1989); People v. Whitlow, 89 111.2d 322, 433
N.E.2d 629, 633-34, cert, denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982); State v.
Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 525-27 (1982); State v.
Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398, 404-05 (1983); State v.
Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471, 474 (N.M. App. 1986); State v.
17

Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Ariz. App. 1983).
See also Garvin v. Greenback, 856 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir.
1988) (construing Arizona statutes); Van Duvse v. Israel, 486 F.
Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (construing Wisconsin statutes).
Except for Illinois, all of the states represented in these
decisions have, like Utah, substantially adopted the Uniform
Securities Act.

Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A. 509-14. Therefore, the

decisions are instructive, if not persuasive, authority.

See

State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (relying on
decision from Michigan, another Uniform Securities Act state,
when interpreting a provision of the Utah Uniform Securities
Act).
Although defendant criticizes these state cases as
inconsistent with Hochfelder, the previous discussion of
Hochfelder demonstrates that defendant's reliance on that case as
the controlling authority is not sound.

And, while defendant

finds some support for his position in State v. Puckett,
6 Kan.App.2d 688, 634 P.2d 144, 152 (1981), aff'd, 230 Kan. 296,
640 P.2d 1198 (1982), and People v. Terranova, 38 Colo.App. 476,
563 P.2d 363 (Colo. App. 1977) (but see People v. Blair, 579 P.2d
1133, 1138-39 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) (which supports the State's
position)), those decisions appear to represent a minority view.
Furthermore, defendant's attempt to distinguish some of
the contrary state decisions on the ground that they do not
address statutory provisions similar to section 61-1-27, fails
because he misreads section 61-1-27 as setting forth a "specific
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legislative directive

. . . to construe [the uniform securities]

laws in accordance with the related federal regulation."
Pet. at 13 (emphasis added).

Br. of

As previously noted, under section

61-1-27 the courts "may" construe Utah's laws to coordinate with
the related federal regulation; the legislature did not mandate
that they do so.

Therefore, as both the trial court and the

court of appeals were free to do, this Court may interpret
section 61-1-1(2) not to require an intent to defraud, regardless
of what conclusions the federal courts may have reached with
respect to the related federal regulation.
Finally, defendant overlooks several post-Hochfelder
criminal 10b-5 cases that have upheld jury instructions similar
to those given in defendant's case.

In United States v.

Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2nd Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
445 U.S. 222 (1980), a major issue was "the level of intent
necessary to support a conviction for criminal violations of Rule
10b-5."

588 F.2d at 1370. Under 15 U.S.C. S 78ff, criminal

liability attaches for "willful" violations of any securities
rule or regulation (this is the federal counterpart to Utah's
section 61-1-21).

The trial court had instructed the jury

that it could not convict Chiarella unless it
found that he had acted "knowingly" and
"willfully," and defined these terms to mean
that "the defendant must be aware of what he
was doing and what he was not doing" and that
he must be acting deliberately, and not as a
result of "innocent mistakes, negligence, or
inadvertence or other innocent conduct."
588 F.2d at 1370. Just as defendant does here, Chiarella did not
dispute the trial court's instruction on willfulness but, citing
19

Hochfelder, contended "that when the substantive provisions are
S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Government must prove the additional
element of specific intent to defraud."

Ibid.

Observing that "Chiarella was convicted under a charge
requiring the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he
engaged in 'knowingly wrongful' misconduct," the Second Circuit
held that Hochfelder did not require more than this and the trial
court "correctly refused to charge the jury that the Government
must prove specific intent to defraud."

Id., at 1371.

The court

relied in part on United States v. Charnav, 537 F.2d 341 (7th
Cir.), cert, denied. 429 U.S. 1000 (1976), where in a similar
vein, the Seventh Circuit held that an indictment was not fatally
defective because it failed "to allege a specific intent to
defraud," 537 F.2d at 351-52.
Thus, the few reported decisions in criminal 10b-5
cases have rejected defendant's intent to defraud argument.
noted in United States v. Chestman, 704 F. Supp. 451, 459
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 947 U.S. 551 (2nd Cir. 1991):
In a criminal case alleging violations of
SEC rules, § 78ff provides the level of
intent required for conviction. The
government must prove willful misconduct,
which is to say that the defendant was aware
of what he was doing, that his acts were done
intentionally and deliberately and not as a
result of an innocent mistake, negligence or
inadvertence. See United States v. Dixon.
536 F.2d 1388, 1395, 1397 (2nd Cir. 1976);
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358,
1370 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
445 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 63 L.Ed.2d 348
(1979).
20

As

704 F. Supp. at 459.
Defendant's Strict Liability Argument
Defendant suggests that if an intent to defraud element
is not read into section 61-1-1(2), this "would permit sweeping,
strict-liability
added).

prosecutions."

This is simply wrong.

Br. of Pet. at 13 (emphasis
To convict under section 61-1-

1(2), the State must prove the defendant acted "willfully," see
S 61-1-21, a highly culpable mental state. An offense is a
strict liability offense only when "the statute defining the
offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose
criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited
by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental
state."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1990).
B.

Good Faith Defense

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court
erroneously rejected his instruction on a "good faith" defense.
The court of appeals did not explicitly address this point;
however, its holding concerning an intent to defraud element for
section 61-1-1(2) effectively disposed of the issue.
As defendant notes, "[h]and-in-hand with the scienter
element is the consistent notion that good faith is a defense."
Br. of Pet. at 11. Yet, because intent to defraud is not an
element of section 61-1-1(2), a good faith defense is not
applicable.

See, e.g., Sparrow v. United States, 402 F.2d 826,

828-29 (10th Cir. 1968) (making clear that the good faith defense
does not apply to "the defendant's good faith as to the existence
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of any particular fact or situation," and cautioning that
although a good faith defense exists with regard to the plan or
scheme as a whole, "no matter how firmly the defendant may
believe in the plan, his belief will not justify baseless, false,
or reckless representations or promises"); United States v.
Bover, 694 F.2d 58, 60 (3rd Cir. 1982).
Therefore, the court of appeals correctly upheld the
trial court's refusal to give defendant's good faith instruction.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
TRIAL COURT REASONABLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON
THE ISSUE OF "MATERIALITY"
Defendant asks this Court to reverse the court of
appeals' holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the State's expert to give opinion
testimony concerning the "materiality" of information defendant
failed to disclose to investors.

(Materiality is an element of

securities fraud which the State must prove under section 61-11(2).

Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493.) Although the State conceded

below that the issue was a close one, defendant fails to show
that the court of appeals erred.
The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's
evidentiary ruling on the expert testimony under an abuse of
discretion standard, noting that it would not reverse "in the
'absence of a clear abuse of discretion.'"

Larsen, 828 P.2d at

492 I quoting Lamb v. Banaart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974)).
See also State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) ("As long
22

as the testimony 'will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue,' Utah R. Evid. 702,
admission is generally within the discretion of the trial court
even if such testimony addresses an 'ultimate issue.'").

Cf.

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781-82 n.3 (w[w]hether a piece of
evidence is admissible is a question of law, and we always review
questions of law under a correctness standard," but when the rule
of evidence "vests a measure of discretion in the trial court,"
the appellate court reverses only if it concludes that the trial
court exercised its discretion "unreasonably").
Defendant does not challenge the court of appeals'
standard of review.

Moreover, he does not demonstrate that the

court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the trial court
reasonably exercised its discretion.

In fact, where the issue

was necessarily a close one, the court of appeals correctly
deferred to the trial court's decision which was reasonably
supported by the analysis in United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d
179, 183 (5th Cir.), modified, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987), and
the broad construction this Court recently gave to rules 702 and
704, Utah Rules of Evidence, in State v. Span, 819 P.2d at 332
n.l ("Case law supports the proposition that an expert may render
an opinion that certain actions constitute a crime. . . . As long
as the testimony will 'assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence to determine a fact in issue,' . . . its admission is
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generally within the discretion of the trial court[.]").
In short, the court of appeals would have been
justified in finding an abuse of discretion "only if there was no
reasonable basis for the [trial court's] decision,"

Crookston v.

Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991) (applying
the "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing trial court's
decision on motion for new trial) (footnote omitted).

Defendant

does not demonstrate that the court of appeals was compelled to
find an abuse of discretion on the ground that there was no
reasonable basis for the trial court's decision.
The court of appeals relied heavily on Lueben in
upholding the trial court's evidentiary ruling.

In that case,

the Fifth Circuit, reviewing a conviction for making materially
false statements to a federally insured savings and loan
institution, held that the trial court had erroneously excluded
the testimony of a defense expert witness regarding the
5

Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
Rule 704 provides:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
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materiality of false statements allegedly made to the financial
institution.

The court rejected the claim that the expert's

opinions constituted legal conclusions and therefore were
inadmissible under rule 704, Federal Rules of Evidence.

It

reasoned that "Lueben sought to ask [the expert] the factual
question of whether false statements in this case would have 'the
capacity to influence' a loan officer of a savings and loan
institution, not the legal question of whether the statements
were 'material.'"

812 F.2d at 184.6

The court of appeals likened the testimony of the
State's expert in defendant's case to the fact-oriented inquiry
on materiality discussed in Lueben:
[W]e are persuaded by Lueben that use of the
term "material" may be admitted as
permissible fact-oriented testimony. Upon
review of the record, we conclude that the
expert in this case used the term "material"
in a factual sense.
Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493.
Defendant criticizes the court of appeals' reliance on
Lueben and focuses on three cases:

Scop v. United States, 846

F.2d 135 (2nd Cir.), modified on rehearing, 856 F.2d 5 (1988);
Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir.
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); and Adalman v. Baker,

6

The Fifth Circuit's modification of its original opinion
did not appear to disturb the substance of its analysis on this
point. Although in its modifying opinion the court held that the
question of "materiality" was a legal question for the judge,
rather than a fact question for the jury, it did not criticize
the original opinion's analysis of the rule 704 issue. Lueben,
816 F.2d at 1033.
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Watts & Cow 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986).

The court of appeals

correctly distinguished these cases from Lueben on the ground
that they illustrate the inadmissibility of legal conclusions by
an expert under rule 704. For example, in Scop, the court was
troubled because the expert "made no attempt to couch the opinion
testimony at issue in even conclusory factual statements but drew
directly upon the language of the statute and accompanying
regulations concerning 'manipulation' and
140.

f

fraud.'ft

846 F.2d at

The court commented that "[h]ad the expert merely testified

that controlled buying and selling of the kind alleged here can
create artificial price levels to lure outside investors, no
sustainable objection could have been made."

Ibid.

In Marx, the court held that the trial court erred in
allowing an expert witness, who was qualified as an expert in
securities regulation, to give his opinion as to the legal
obligations of the parties under a contract.

The court first

noted that "[t]estimony concerning the ordinary practices of
those engaged in the securities business is admissible under the
same theory as testimony concerning the ordinary practices of
physicians or concerning other trade customs:

to enable the jury

to evaluate the conduct of the parties against the standards of
ordinary practice in the industry."

550 F.2d at 509. However,

it concluded that the expert's testimony "did not concern only
the customary practices of a trade or business;" the expert had
improperly rendered legal opinions as to the meaning of the
contract terms at issue.

Id. at 509-10.
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And, in Adalman, a party sought to have an expert
witness "testify as to his conclusion that the applicable law did
not require the disclosure of . . . omitted information [in a
securities offering]."

807 F.2d at 365.

In upholding the trial

court's exclusion of such testimony, the court, relying heavily
on Marx, observed that "it is obvious that [the party] proffered
[the expert] to testify in substantial part to the meaning and
the applicability of the securities laws to the transactions
here, giving his expert opinion on the governing law[;] this
flies squarely in the face of the precedent —
precedent —

set out in Marx."

and logic of that

Id. at 368.

Reading SCOP, Marx, Adalman, and Lueben together in an
effort to apply them to the instant case is indeed a difficult
task.

See Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App.)

("There is no bright line between permissible questions under
Rule 704 and those that call for overbroad legal responses."),
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

At first blush, it might

appear that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
the expert's opinions.

However, unlike the testimony in Scop,

Marx and Adalman, the expert's testimony here did not constitute
a legal opinion.

His testimony was more akin to the opinion

testimony on the factual question discussed in Lueben:
the false statements had the capacity to influence.

whether

While it

clearly would have been better for the expert to steer away from
the term "material," he appears to have used the term not in the
legal sense but rather in the factual sense of what the ordinary
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practice in the industry is, or what would be important to or
have the capacity to influence an investor.

In any event, the

testimony appears to be well within the limits of rule 704 as
defined in State v. Span, 819 P.2d at 332 n.l, where this Court
noted that "[c]ase law supports the proposition that an expert
may render an opinion that certain actions constitute a crime"
and then cited with apparent approval the following casess
United States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 483-84 (10th Cir. 1986)
(officer of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was allowed
to testify that a device was a firearm subject to registration
with the Bureau); United States v. Logan, 641 F.2d 860, 863 (10th
Cir. 1981) (expert properly testified that funds were improperly
taken from corporation); and United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d
187, 188 (6th Cir. 1975) (expert properly testified that certain
drugs come within a particular statutory classification).
In sum, in light of Lueben and this Court's expansive
interpretation of rules 702 and 704 in Span (relying on federal
cases), the court of appeals did not err in holding that the
trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in admitting the
expert testimony under rules 702 and 704.

See State v. Banner,

717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986) (the appellate courts of this
state look to the interpretation of the federal rules of evidence
by the federal courts to aid in interpreting Utah's rules of
evidence).

As the court of appeals correctly observed, "[i]n

general, expert testimony is suitable in securities fraud cases
because the technical nature of securities is not within the
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knowledge of the average layman or a subject within the common
experience and would help the jury understand the issues before
them."

Larsen, 828 P.2d at 492 (citing rule 702 and Dixon v.

Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982)).7
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should
affirm the court of appeals' decision.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this c*/

day of December,

1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
0
Assistant Attorney General

7

Defendant claims that the court of appeals "apparently
read Rule 704 to mean that opinion testimony is admissible if it
goes to an issue of ultimate fact because, by definition, it is
not a legal conclusion." Br. of Pet. at 24-25. However, this is
refuted by the court's clear statement that "[d]espite the
appropriateness of expert testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule
704 was not intended to allow experts to give legal conclusions."
Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493.
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